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Many scholars cite the British reoccupation of Malaya after World War II as an example of a
successful counterinsurgency. However, this success did not come without notable casualties; almost
5,000 civilians died during the conflict.1 Anti-British forces caused many of these deaths, but
civilians also died at the hands of British troops. While authorities described these deaths as
accidents, one event threw doubt on this explanation. In the village at Batang Kali, on December 12,
1948, a patrol of the Scots Guards shot twenty-five Chinese villagers. While official reports claimed
that they shot the civilians while they were trying to escape, in line with informal British policy, later
revelations suggest that the unit shot the villagers without provocation.
Although the Batang Kali massacre was unique in the number of civilian casualties, along
with authorities’ use of mass detention and other draconian measures justified under Emergency
Regulations, it hurt British efforts to win the “hearts and minds” in Malaya. Even one event can
have long lasting effects on civilians’ willingness to cooperate in the larger political-military effort.
The war in Malaya often threw British units into dangerous situations; the communists used their
knowledge of the jungle terrain and terrorist tactics to secure advantage against the more numerous
and well-armed British. Yet Batang Kali is the only recorded case of a British unit killing large
numbers of civilians. Why did the Scots Guards decide to kill these villagers while other patrols in
similar situations did not?
Authorities conducted a cursory investigation in this incident in 1948 in response to the
public outcry in Malaya; they quickly concluded that the unit justifiably shot the villagers as they
tried to escape. Privately, the Attorney General admitted that the incident was “a bona fide
mistake.”2 In 1970, a British newspaper, The People, reopened discussion of the massacre based on
new testimony from unit members. Although the British government did then refer the incident to
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the Department of Public Prosecutions, the lead prosecutor decided to terminate the investigation
less than six months later.3 In 2009, based on new evidence regarding the Attorney General and his
role in covering up the incident, the government has agreed to reopen the case.4 However, even if
the victims’ families receive recognition of the incident and compensation for their losses, these
investigations cannot answer the question of what led the Scots Guards to massacre these civilians
when other units in similar situations did not.
To gain a better understanding of the conflict in Malaya and the challenges British units
faced, I examined secondary literature on the history of the Malayan Emergency and reports of the
Batang Kali incident. I did most of my research in the United Kingdom. I went to the National
Archives, where I found information on the military’s reaction to the Batang Kali incident. While
there are few records about the incident still available, I examined the military’s 1970 investigation. I
also inspected military records of the various units involved during the early days of the Emergency
and information regarding the United Kingdom’s commitment to the Geneva Conventions to
determine military socialization efforts. The National Archives also holds information about military
training programs and enforcement of military justice. I also examined Cabinet level documents to
assess civilian efforts to influence unit behavior. However, government documents do not include
personal descriptions of events or reflections. To get a better sense of the Emergency from the unit
perspective, I listened to hours of oral histories at the Imperial War Museum. These oral histories
gave me a better sense of what the conflict looked like and how the military functioned.
In this chapter, I briefly outline the dependent variable in this case, the various units actively
engaged in combat in Malaya between 1948 and 1952. I then explore the most common
explanations for the Scots Guards’ actions and reveal why they are not helpful in explaining why
Press release from the Director of Public Prosecutions (29 June 1970), DEFE 70/101, National Archives in Kew,
United Kingdom.
4 Robert Verkaik, “60 years on, Malaya ‘massacre’ by British troops to be investigated,” The Independent (30 April
2009): http://www.lexisnexis.com (Accessed 5 July 2009).
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other units did not similarly kill civilians. To better understand this variation, I explore three
alternative explanations: Did the military socialize units in the laws of war and appropriate behavior
toward civilians? Did government leaders encourage units to kill civilians? Finally, did different units’
subcultures make them more likely to kill civilians? I find that while the British military and senior
leaders did not adequately socialize units to accept the laws of war, some junior leaders were able to
discipline their units and prevent participation in war crimes. Some junior leaders, however, refused
to enforce organizational norms and supported a countercultural subculture that resisted tactical
innovation and may have contributed to the unit’s participation in war crimes.

British military units in Malaya at the outset of the emergency
After World War II, the British returned to Malaya to recover control from Japanese military
forces. During the war, even after their withdrawal, the British government supported guerrilla
forces that continued to fight the Japanese. These guerrilla forces did not completely disband and
served as the foundation for anti-British resistance. Agitating for independence and turning towards
communism, these forces targeted British commercial interests, attacking rubber plantations and tin
mines. By June 1948, escalating violence and the assassinations of several prominent British
landowners led British authorities in Malaya to declare an “Emergency,” giving the police and
government greater flexibility in prosecuting the war against the insurgents.
At the time of the Emergency, there were few British forces in Malaya that could aid the
police; the Seaforth Highlanders and the Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI) moved
from Singapore to join the 4th Queens Own Hussars and Cameron Highlanders.5 In August 1948,
three regiments of the Guards Brigades arrived: the Coldstream Guards, the Grenadier Guards, and
the Scots Guards. The British military deployed additional units in 1949-1950, including the Green
John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992):
32.
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Howards and the Suffolk Regiment. Once in Malaya, these regiments underwent limited jungle
warfare training. Although the British had extensive experience in jungle warfare, most recently in
Burma during World War II, military leaders had not formalized this experience into a specific
jungle warfare curriculum. As the Malayan conflict continued, British authorities refined these
efforts. However, in the early days of the Emergency, this training exposed soldiers to the extremes
of the jungle environment and reinforced basic military skills.
After a short period of acclimation, regiments went to different areas surrounding Kuala
Lumpur, the capital of the Malayan Federation. A Far East Land Forces situation report described
general military activities: “Vigorous patrolling by mixed Army-Police detachments continues in the
areas in which bandit activity has been reported and several clashes have taken place.”6 All British
regiments describe similar activities in their quarterly regimental histories for this time period.7
However, of these units, only the Scots Guards faced accusations of intentional civilian killings, the
massacre at Batang Kali.

Intentional killing of civilians
Guerrilla warfare imposes tremendous burdens on civilians; government and insurgent
forces trap innocent bystanders who must negotiate between their demands. In Malaya, insurgents
threatened civilians to collect money and food for forces living in the jungle. At the same time, the
government sought assistance from civilians to discover the location of guerrilla camps and cut off
food supplies. Insurgents had numerous advantages over British forces; they lived in closer
proximity to villagers, they sometimes had relatives or close friends in the village, and they were not

Far East Land Forces (FARELF) Situation Report, no. 4 (28 July to 10 August, 1948), CO 717/170/1, National
Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
7 I reviewed Quarterly Historical Reports for the Coldstream and Grenadier Guards, the KOYLIs, the 4th Queens Own
Hussars, the Green Howards, and the Suffolk regiments. I also reviewed the Quarterly Historical reports for the
Headquarters Malaya District and North Malaya Sub-District.
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afraid to threaten violence. British forces thus faced a dual threat: the insurgents and the silent
network in villages who, willingly or unwillingly, supported them. While the insurgents rarely sought
out contact with British forces, they did use terrorist tactics to intimidate civilians and elicit material
support. British forces, unable to distinguish friend from foe, had to adjust to the constant risk of an
insurgent attack.
In this section, I discuss British military policy regarding minimum force and its relation to
civilians along with British military efforts to comply with the new Geneva Conventions. I also
describe the incident at Batang Kali. I look at communist propaganda to determine the importance
of this incident and to find any other instances of mass civilian killings. Finally, I describe the
activities of the other regiments that did not participate in war crimes. Many regiments faced dangers
from guerilla warfare and insurgent ambushes, but only the Scots Guards massacred civilian
villagers.
The Principle of Minimum Force and the Geneva Conventions
Britain, as a colonial power, has extensive experience with indigenous violence and
revolutions; these experiences led the army, especially in civil disturbances, to rely on the principle of
minimum force. In the military pamphlet, Imperial Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, the government
outlines the basic principle of these missions: “no more force shall be applied than the situation
demands.”8 Regiments in Malaya were to work with and defer to civil authorities regarding action on
intelligence or responding to threats. While some Malayan villagers, primarily Chinese squatters,
posed challenges for British officials because they supplied food or other materials to the insurgents,
they did not pose an imminent threat. Units that discovered civilians providing assistance to
insurgents were to detain and interrogate them to discover the location of insurgent camps.
Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (13 June 1949), CO 537/5068, National Archives in Kew,
United Kingdom. Although the government revised this edition in 1949, it was originally written in the late 1800s in the
context of wars in India, and thus would have been available to officers and soldiers prior to service in the Malayan
Emergency.
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In addition to the principle of minimum force, Britain also faced new obligations to protect
civilians under the recently negotiated Geneva Conventions. While the Geneva Convention
negotiations did not end until December 1948, the military was aware of the treaty and making plans
to comply.9 However, there was great debate between military and civilian officials about what the
treaty should and should not include. Notably, the military objected to a prohibition on reprisals,
arguing that “a complete ban on reprisals (other than on personnel) could not be allowed in
situations like Malaya today…an occupying power must have powers to take stern measures against
passive resistance. These measures need not be unduly ruthless or inhumane.”10 Many of the
common unit tactics during the first few months of the Emergency, including burning down villages
accused of supporting the insurgents and detaining thousands of suspected collaborators, seem
consistent with this logic. Even though the military voiced concerns about the limitations of the
Geneva Convention, there is no evidence that they felt the need to retain the right to intentionally
target and kill civilians. While the British never explicitly stated their intent to comply with the
Geneva Conventions during this conflict, evidence does exist that they drafted pamphlets to inform
soldiers of their legal obligations under the treaty.11 Although the explicit instruction did not begin
until 1950, military leaders were aware of the nature of the treaty, and mass civilian killings violated
other treaties and customary international law.
The Massacre at Batang Kali
At the outset of the Emergency, units could only respond to threats; the small number of
forces available and lack of intelligence limited their options to seek out the enemy. On December
11, 1948, a Scots Guards patrol set out to investigate a village that reportedly provided support to
“Geneva Conventions 1949 Ratification Discussion-General Policy,” Minute Sheet, Army Chief of Staff to Sir Robert
Craigie, UK Representative to the Geneva Convention negotiations, WO 32/13612, National Archives in Kew, United
Kingdom.
10 “Minute re Geneva and Malaya, reprisals, July 1949,” Geneva Conventions 1949-Questions of Principle arising at
Diplomatic Conference Geneva, WO 32/13613, National Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
11 “Implementation of Geneva Convention, 1949 (8 February 1950),” POW Convention, 1949 – Coordination arising
out of, WO 32/13614, National Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
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local insurgents. The Malaya District Headquarters’ Quarterly Historical Report documents the
official version of the event:
Acting on police information, patrol of 2SG [Scots Guards] found 26 male suspects
in a kongsi house … on the evening of 11 December. 1 who attempted to escape
was shot dead, and the remainder confined in the kongsi house under guard for the
night. Acting on information supplied by one of the suspects, a kepala [headman]
arriving with a lorry [truck] full of food was arrested early in the morning. Shortly
afterwards 25 suspects attempted a mass escape on a pre-arranged signal. They ran
into parties of our own troops who had been positioned to block the exits into the
jungle, and 24 of them were shot dead.12
This version of events, which various authorities repeated in other official reports, however, raised
questions both in the local media and with local government officials. Anthony Short, author of the
official history of the Malayan Emergency for the Malaysian government, with access to many
Malayan and British documents, notes that what British authorities should have touted as a great
success they instead buried: “That 24 bandits should have been killed was in itself remarkable but
the reticence shown by the army in what should have been a considerable victory made it even more
so.”13 Given the difficulty of finding insurgents, such a large number of kills represented a major
blow against the insurgents. This lack of publicity raises questions about the initial version of events.
In the days following the massacre, local officials and Chinese organizations’ protests led the
Attorney General, Sir Stafford Foster-Sutton, to conduct an informal inquiry. He interviewed several
members of the patrol and visited the area. However, he conducted no formal inquiry, and there are
no records to document his informal investigation. When a member of Parliament questioned Sir
Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, about the incident and the inquiry’s results, he
responded: “The Chinese in question were detained for interrogation under Emergency Regulations
powers. An inquiry was made into this incident by the civil authorities and, after careful

“Headquarters Malaya District G Branch, Quarterly Historical Report 1948 October-December,” WO 268/555,
National Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
13 Anthony Short. The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960 (New York, NY: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc.,
1975): 166.
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7

8
consideration of the evidence and a personal visit to the place concerned, the Attorney General was
satisfied that, had the Security Forces not opened fire, the suspect Chinese would have made good
an attempt to escape.”14 The Scots Guard’s official military history for the campaign, published in
1952, includes a short discussion of the event that while upholding the official story, raises questions
about how the unit felt about their actions: “The 12th December 1948 will always remain engraven in
the minds of certain members of “G” Company as it will on those of the inhabitants of Batang Kali;
for on that day twenty six members of the village were killed by a patrol. Whether the action was right or
wrong need not concern us at the moment. Suffice to say that those killed were known to be active bandit
sympathizers.”15 Despite the British government and military’s best efforts to defend the unit’s
actions, there remained a cloud over the events at Batang Kali.
During 1969 and early 1970, as the United States military dealt with revelations of the My Lai
massacre in Vietnam, William Cootes, a member of the Scots Guards patrol that shot the villagers,
told his version of the Batang Kali killings to the British newspaper, The People. He described his
commander informing the unit that they were going to a village and would “wipe out anybody they
found there.”16 His fellow platoon member, Alan Tuppen, also came forward and detailed the
instructions of the captain before they went to the village: “He said we were to go out on patrol and
that our objective would be to wipe out a particular village and everyone in it because, he said, they
were either terrorists themselves or were helping terrorists in that area.”17 After the platoon
separated the men from the women and children, Tuppen remembers the sergeant calling the men
to attention: “He told us that all the remaining men and boys were to be shot. He then said if

“Incident, Selangor,” Excerpt from The Hansard (26 January 1949), DEFE 70/101, National Archives in Kew, United
Kingdom.
15 Scots Guards. Malaya 1948-1951, 2nd Battalion Scots Guards (Kuala Kubu Bharu, Malaya: The Battalion, 1951): 57 (Italics
added by author).
16 Testimony of William Cootes to The People, Feb. 1, 1970, Allegations of Massacre, 1948, DEFE 70/101, National
Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
17 Testimony of Allen Tuppen to The People, Feb. 1, 1970, Allegations of Massacre, 1948, DEFE 70/101, National
Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
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anyone of us were too squeamish to carry this out, we should let him know there and then by taking
one pace forward and falling out of the parade.”18 The unit divided the remaining villagers into
groups, and three soldiers took each group to a different area at the perimeter of the village. Tuppen
described the actual massacre: “After a few seconds I heard shooting from one of some of these
other groups. Instinctively, we started firing too at the villagers in front of us. The villagers began to
fall. One man with bullets in him kept crawling and we fired several more rounds into him but he
still would not die. He was finally killed when a bullet went through his head.”19 Tuppen clearly
refutes the official descriptions of the incident: “The important point I wish to make is that none of
the villagers were shot while trying to escape of their own free will or after being forced away by any
action on our part.”20 Other members of the patrol also came forward to support Cootes and
Tuppen’s version of events.21
In addition to this new testimony, The People’s investigation raised questions about other
elements of the military’s version of events. In an interview with Captain George Ramsay, the
platoon commander who allegedly gave the orders to “wipe out the village,” he noted the unit’s
poor marksmanship; “we had often been criticized before the incident because of our inability to hit
moving targets. Up to that day our bag of terrorists had been very poor indeed.”22 If the unit could
not shoot at moving targets with any accuracy, how could they kill all of the villagers as they
escaped? New evidence also came forward regarding the credibility of the inquiry. Many of the unit
members argued that they invented their testimony to the inquiry after the fact. Cootes recalled that
the questioner, although he questioned the story, voiced support for the patrol: “I remember the
official saying it was strange that if the men had made a run for it, why their bodies were found lying
Testimony of Allen Tuppen.
Testimony of Allen Tuppen.
20 Testimony of Allen Tuppen.
21 Other soldiers that came forward are Victor Remedios, George Kydd, and Robert Brownrigg.
22 Interview with George Ramsay, The People, February 1, 1970, Allegations of Massacre, 1948, DEFE 70/101, National
Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
18
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closely together in different groups. He suggested they wouldn’t make a break in groups, they would
be more spread out all over the place. I just repeated the story that I had already told him and I
clearly remember his last words to me. He said he hoped we got away with it.”23 The soldiers’ new
testimonies and a public outcry led the government to refer the case to the Department of Public
Prosecutions, but after several months the Director issued a statement that he was ending the
investigation due to a lack of government documents and inability to verify testimony from an event
over 20 years ago.24

Propaganda and Civilian Killings in Malaya
In 1948, the incident received little more than a small note in the English-language
newspaper The Straits Times. However, Malayan and Chinese media did cover the incident and
demanded explanations from local authorities. Communist propagandists took full advantage of the
story to paint British forces as brutal imperialists. The Freedom News, a communist newspaper,
described the massacre: “Machine guns were then put up. Sharp and woeful cries were then heard
amidst the firing of machine guns with bullets passing through the thick foliages of the rubber trees
into the air.”25 The Malayan Monitor, another propaganda publication, questioned the official
explanation of events: “Even the Government puppets in Malaya felt it necessary ‘to ask for further
information’ when 24 detained civilians were shot on December 12, ‘while attempting to escape.’”26
Communist publications compared the British actions of burning villages and detaining civilians to

Testimony of William Cootes.
Press release from the Director of Public Prosecutions (29 June 1970), Allegations of Massacre, 1948, DEFE 70/101,
National Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
25 Freedom News: The Untold Story of the Communist Underground Publication (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, 2008): 31.
26 Malayan Monitor (London, UK: Putera – A Malay Confederation comprising the Malay Nationalist Party, PETA (Malay
Youth Organization), AWAS (Progressive Malaya women’s organization, Malay Peasants Union, several Malay groups)):
January 1949.
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the brutal behavior of the Japanese during World War II.27 A skeptic might say that the Communists
would exaggerate or even fabricate events to make their British enemy look bad to earn the support
of the civilians. While impugning the British undoubtedly was their motivation, the propaganda
accounts confirm many of the details in the unit soldiers’ 1970 testimony.
One might expect similar propaganda to continue throughout the Malayan campaign;
insurgents would get more support from villagers if they depicted the British as brutal and arbitrary,
and offered them protection. However, while there are many other descriptions of alleged British
‘crimes’ within these publications, there are no other descriptions of mass civilian killings. The
publications targeted National Registration and the New Villages program that relocated Chinese
squatters into “concentration camps,” but there was no discussion of civilian casualties. By 1952, the
tone of the propaganda publications changed from focusing on events inside Malaya to communist
victories and struggles throughout Asia.28 I looked at these propaganda publications to find
additional incidents of civilian killings, but I could find no other events that compared to the
massacre at Batang Kali.
In addition to the lack of specific massacres or incidents of mass killing in propaganda, I
could not find many events where British forces successfully killed large numbers of insurgents.
While enemy kills was not as important in measuring success as it was to U.S. forces in Vietnam,
British units still had a strong incentive to report kills to demonstrate progress in the
counterinsurgency. However, I went through all the intelligence and unit reports I could access for
the period between June 1948 and December 1952, and I found few events where units claimed

Karl Hack, Defence and Decolonization in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore 1941-1968 (Richmond, UK: Curzon
Press, 2001): 118.
28 “Malaya Monthly Emergency and Political Report, 15 December 1953-15 January 1954,” SE Asia Department –
Monthly Emergency and Political Reports in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, CO 1022/208, National Archives
at Kew, United Kingdom.
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more than one or two kills per incident.29 Even five or six kills per incident was rare. I did find,
however, one note: “one female civilian accidentally shot.”30 This entry is one of the few records I
found that recorded British forces killing civilians. While it is unlikely that British forces recorded all,
or even most, of the civilians that they “accidentally” killed, there is also no evidence that mass
civilian killing, even masquerading as insurgent deaths, occurred. Anthony Short, in an interview
during the 1970 media blitz about the Batang Kali incident, noted: “I would guess that maybe in the
whole twelve years of the emergency there I doubt if there were more than a hundred people killed
by stray bombs, bullets, or anything else.”31 While the Batang Kali massacre was devastating for its
victims and had a psychological impact on the soldiers involved, it did not represent common
behavior of British forces in Malaya.
Other British Regiments in Malaya
The uniqueness of the incident at Batang Kali might make it seem uninteresting as a topic of
study: many historians, such as Short, argue that the massacre was an anomalous event. However,
we should investigate any war crime, particularly unprovoked killing of civilians, to determine any
action the government or military might take to prevent similar future incidents. The massacre also
fueled propaganda against the British and may have led Chinese villagers to support the insurgents.
While British forces did not frequently kill civilians as they did in Batang Kali, they did burn down
villages and detain Chinese individuals on questionable evidence. These tactics created the
conditions for a longer and more brutal battle for the British forces.32
During the early days of the Emergency, brutal attacks on civilians and cooperation between

Federation of Malaya, Singapore – Law and Order Military Situation – War Office Weekly Situation Summaries, CO
717/170/2, National Archives at Kew, United Kingdom.
30 Federation of Malaya, Singapore – Law and Order Military Situation – War Office Weekly Situation Summaries, CO
717/170/2, National Archives at Kew, United Kingdom.
31 Interview with Anthony Short, BBC Television-Scotland, “Reporting Scotland” (2 February 1970), WO 296/41,
National Archives at Kew, United Kingdom.
32 Richard Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948-1960 (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish
International, 2004): 254.
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insurgents and villagers created great challenges for British forces. However, only the Scots Guards
engaged in mass killing of civilians. Other regiments that deployed on similar patrols did not
intentionally target and kill large numbers of civilians; they felt empathy for young insurgents and
villagers. Raymond Burdett, a member of the Suffolk Regiment, remembered one encounter with
the enemy: “When we met some of these communists, we captured some of them, the poor devils
were frightened out of their wits.”33 Herbert Moss, a member of the KOYLI regiment, recalls that
many of the villagers were innocent victims: “Local people in the outlying areas were very
resourceful, very hard working…frightened of the terrorists.”34 The importance of Batang Kali in
fueling the conflict and the variation between these regiments’ behavior calls out for explanation:
Why did the Scots Guards kill civilians when other similarly positioned regiments did not?

Common Explanations
Each time problems of civilian killings in Malaya and the incident at Batang Kali captured
British national attention, journalists, policymakers, and military officials put forward explanations
that shifted blame to the insurgents or excused the soldiers’ actions. Military leaders noted the
necessity of shooting escaping detainees, even civilians, in the larger conflict; they argued that these
civilians could give the insurgents valuable assistance to continue to fight against British forces.
Civilians noted the inexperience of the soldiers and problems with the National Service program.
Journalists and participants blamed the nature of guerrilla warfare and hatred of the enemy amongst
the army units. In this section I address each of these explanations and contend that while they may
have increased the likelihood of civilian killings, they cannot explain why the Scots Guards killed
civilians at Batang Kali while other regiments with similar responsibilities and challenges did not.
Raymond Sydney Burdett (Suffolk Regiment), oral history interview, no date, cassette tape, Imperial War Museum,
London, United Kingdom.
34 Herbert Moss (KOYLI), oral history interview, July 6, 1998, cassette tape, Imperial War Museum, London, United
Kingdom.
33
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Military necessity and the policy of shooting escapees
One of the main principles in counterinsurgency strategy is to separate the fighters from
their source of material support, the people. In Malaya, one of the most crucial resources that the
insurgents received from civilians was food. British forces used food denial as a key strategy; units
took strict actions against villagers accused of helping insurgents. Eventually, British forces moved
Chinese squatters into “new villages” that they fenced in and patrolled to avoid contact with
insurgents. However, in the initial days of the conflict, British forces sought to achieve control
through policing. Sir Henry Guerney, the High Commissioner of the Federation of Malaya, in a
conversation with Secretary of State for the Colonies, Creech Jones, argued: “The Chinese ‘are as
you know notoriously inclined to lean towards whichever side frightens them more and at this
moment that seems to be the government.”35 Officers encouraged units to shoot at people trying to
escape, even if they only suspected the escapees were villagers aiding the insurgents. In the weeks
following the Batang Kali incident, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Malaya, Sir Charles
Hamilton Boucher, noted: “it must be widely understood that those who have consorted with or
assisted bandits were enemies of the state and ran the risk of incurring military action in the same
way as those who were killed at Batang Kali.”36 The chaplain of the Scots Guards concurred: “The
shooting of escaping prisoners was inquired into—and accepted as a nasty, but necessary part of a
nasty operation.”37 Despite this widely understood and informally accepted policy, not all units used
deadly force against civilians. If military necessity explained why the Scots Guards patrol shot
villagers at Batang Kali, I would have expected to find more cases of civilian killings. The uniqueness
of the Batang Kali incident raises questions about how widely military leaders communicated and
Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007): 455.
36 Malayan Monitor 5.
37 Frank Robson and Tom Brown, “Guards ‘killed reds as they fled’,” Express (February 3, 1970), WO 296/41, National
Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
35
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accepted this policy.
Lack of experience and the role of National Servicemen
Historians and British military authorities have used inexperience to explain the behavior of
the Scots Guards at Batang Kali. Despite extensive British participation in jungle warfare in Burma
during World War II, many of those veterans left the army before units deployed to Malaya.38 The
units also suffered because of budget cuts and overstretch after World War II.39 While these units
lacked the extensive battle experience of their World War II counterparts, all British regiments that
deployed Malaya at the outset of the Emergency faced a similar situation. This lack of experience,
while it meant that British soldiers lacked the understanding of what jungle warfare or active combat
was like, cannot explain variation in unit participation in civilian killing.
After the soldiers’ revelations in The People, the headquarters of the Scots Guards wrote a
memo that was highly critical of the unit and its competence: “It will be remembered that 2SG
[Scots Guards] had only been in Malaya a matter of weeks, and that for some members of the patrol,
which included MT [military transport] drivers, sick men, and at least one member of the Corps of
Drums, this was almost certainly their first operation.”40 While this criticism might explain the poor
performance of the unit, it does not fully explain the unit’s participation in war crimes. The villagers
in Batang Kali were not armed and the soldiers retained control of the situation; at no time did any
of the soldiers describe threatening behavior by the villagers. This description also conflicts with the
testimonies of many of the unit members, who claimed they participated in several patrols before
setting out for Batang Kali.41 If the Scots Guards patrol had included such low quality soldiers, one

Daniel Marston, “Lost and found in the jungle: the Indian and British Army jungle warfare doctrines for Burma, 19435, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948-60,” in Hew Strachan, ed. Big Wars and Small Wars: The British army and lessons of war
in the twentieth century (London, UK: Routledge, 2006): 97.
39 David Erskine, ed. The Scots Guards, 1919-1955 (London, UK: William Clowes and Sons, Ltd., 1956): 469.
40 “Allegations of Massacre, 1948,” OUT Telegram from High Commissioner Federation of Malaya to Colonial Office,
“Following Personal for Higham from Newboult-Incident at Batang Kali on 12 December,” 1 January 1949, DEFE
70/101, National Archives in Kew, United Kingdom.
41 Testimony of William Cootes and Alan Tuppen.
38
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would expect that their lack of skills would make the killing all of the “escaping” prisoners unlikely; a
few of the villagers should have escaped, or at least incurred injuries. This explanation seems
inconsistent with some of the evidence on the scene and the testimony of the patrol soldiers; it
conveniently places blame on the unit without examining the organization’s obligations to prepare
and monitor them.
In a similar vein, many critics blamed the National Service program for weakening British
army units and sending unmotivated troops to fight.42 Under this post-World War II program,
young men were to serve in the army for a set period of time.43 These soldiers often would deploy to
Malaya but rotate out just after completing jungle warfare training or after gaining patrol
experience.44 More cynically, some critics feared that National Servicemen lacked the drive or
character to be good soldiers.45 While many officers and soldiers agreed that National Servicemen
caused problems of additional paperwork and frequent troop rotation, few argued that they did not
serve as competently as regular soldiers. William John Martin, a member of the Suffolk regiment,
argued: “At least 75% of the men in 1st Battalion Suffolk Regiment, one of the most successful
battalions in Malaya, were National Servicemen, where the majority of our junior officers were
National Service officers.”46 GOC Robert Urquhart, who took over from General Boucher in 1950,
reported: “I make no distinction between my National Service boys and my regular soldiers: one is
as good as the other.”47 Many soldiers, regardless of unit, agreed that there was little discernible
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difference between national servicemen and regular soldiers.48
Guerrilla warfare, the jungle environment and the inevitability of civilian deaths
Finally, many observers argue that guerrilla warfare, particularly in the jungle, made
accidental killings of civilians inevitable.49 Soldiers often described the terror of jungle patrols; in
addition to watching out for insurgent fighters, they had to navigate difficult terrain and avoid
dangerous animals and insects. Many patrols would stay in the jungle for days, even weeks, without
encountering the enemy and then, in a brief moment, insurgents would ambush them.50 Other
soldiers described finding booby-trapped bodies of civilians and British soldiers.51 In response to The
People’s Batang Kali coverage, R.V. Brinnicombe-Wood, a sergeant with the 4th Queens Own
Hussars regiment, argued: “The uninitiated may not be aware that we fought against people who had
no respect for the Geneva Convention; they took no prisoners and, in consequence our maxim was
‘kill or be killed.’”52 The guerrilla tactics of the insurgents, and their ability to disappear into the
jungle, angered British soldiers trained to fight on a conventional battlefield.
However, even under these extreme circumstances, theater jungle training provided soldiers
with a specific protocol to follow when identifying targets to avoid killing innocent civilians. Many
of the soldiers who participated in the massacre remember “snap shooting” practice during which
trainers instructed them to distinguish between enemy and civilian targets. Regardless of the dangers
facing units during jungle patrols, the Scots Guards in Batang Kali did not face this kind of threat.
The unit had already separated the men in the village from the women, searched them for weapons,
and detained them overnight. These unarmed civilians, even if they had provided material support to
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the enemy, posed no imminent threat to the unit that would justify their deaths.
While the villagers of Batang Kali may not have done anything to justify their deaths, the
soldiers who came forward pointed to brutal enemy tactics to explain their actions. When the Scots
Guards arrived in Malaya and began their patrols, they heard many stories of insurgent atrocities
targeting British landowners and local civilians.53 Many soldiers, frustrated with their lack of success
and continuing insurgent actions, took out their aggression on civilians.54 A common British army
tactic was to burn down villages near major insurgent attacks; the units assumed that the village must
have provided insurgents with food and other support.55 Guerrilla warfare, these soldiers argued,
justified their actions.
While it may be easy to imagine soldiers frustrated with guerrilla tactics seeking vengeance
against civilians who were providing aid to insurgents, there were many other soldiers who hated the
enemy but did not kill civilians. Herbert Moss, who joined his regiment, the KOYLIs, already in
Malaya in 1948, described his disgust: “I hated them because of the atrocities that we had heard
about.”56 Other soldiers either had no feelings toward the enemy or actually felt pity or a grudging
respect. Michael Gilbert, a member of the Suffolk regiment, reflected: “[It was] my job to do
something if the situation came my way, but I had no particular feelings or such hatred.”57 Frederick
Dobbs, who served with the Green Howards, noted: “I pitied the enemy – my politics at 18 were
nil…But I was out there because the government said I was out there, there was a lot of young lads
in the enemy camp who were certainly in that predicament, some of them 14-15 years [of] age who
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didn’t know what they were doing.”58 Many soldiers, rather than developing hatred for the
insurgents and Malayan civilians, maintained some empathy.
Guerrilla warfare and enemy atrocities might have made units more likely to commit war
crimes. However, despite the insurgent’s brutal tactics, some soldiers expressed either antipathy or
sympathy for them and civilian villagers caught in the crossfire. Many soldiers, despite civilian and
British casualties, maintained a professional view of the conflict and their responsibilities. This
explanation fails to address how some units and soldiers avoided developing hatred for the enemy in
the face of the same enemy tactics. While hatred of the enemy may have motivated the Scots Guards
actions, this explanation cannot clarify why other soldiers facing similar emotions did not kill
civilians.

Had any of these common explanations been adequate to explain the actions of the Scots
Guards, they would also have anticipated more incidents of civilian killing. However, after
examining military documents, enemy propaganda, soldiers’ oral histories, and secondary literature, I
can find no additional examples of civilian massacres. The evidence suggests that civilian killing was
not widespread, even in the most difficult days of the conflict. Thus, the question remains: Why did
the Scots Guards massacre civilians when other units in similar situations did not?
In the next section, I explore three alternative explanations: socialization, civilian influence,
and subculture. First, I examine the British military’s socialization of soldiers in the laws of war.
Socialization in the laws of war should include training that informs soldiers about their obligations
and senior leaders’ willingness to enforce the laws of war through imposition of discipline and
specific efforts to punish violators. I looked at training curriculum and records to determine whether
units in Malaya were aware of their obligations to protect civilians. I also inspected military justice
Frederick Dobbs (Green Howards), oral history interview, August 7, 1988, cassette tape, catalog no. 10316, Imperial
War Museum, London, United Kingdom.
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records, unit regulations, and unit members’ oral histories to ascertain whether units believed that
their leaders were committed to military regulations that protected civilians. Second, I examine the
rhetoric of civilian leaders to determine whether they influenced unit behavior; did civilians
exaggerate the importance of the conflict or depict the enemy in a way that suggested the laws of
war did not apply? I looked at civilian leaders’ public statements and soldiers’ recollections to
determine whether these leaders influenced unit behavior. Finally, I considered the units’
subcultures. In the British army, regimental leaders carefully cultivate unit identity. However, this
identity could lead units to develop alternative beliefs and norms that conflict with the wider
organization. Did the unique identity of the Scots Guards lead them to develop norms counter to
the laws of war, and thus to kill civilians? I examined unit histories and oral histories to establish
whether unit subculture led soldiers to disregard the laws of war.

Socialization
Militaries, to persuade soldiers to follow orders and comply with regulations, seek to create
an identity that transforms incoming recruits into professional soldiers. To ensure that troops
understand and respect the laws of war, the military must instruct soldiers in their obligation and test
their ability to apply this knowledge in combat situations. The military must also signal its
commitment to the laws of war; senior and junior leaders must investigate and punish any violations.
I find that the military did not adequately train units in the laws of war, although in theatre units did
receive some instruction on distinguishing between civilian and enemy targets. Senior leaders did not
enforce these instructions consistently, however, and occasionally issued orders that violated the
laws of war. In spite of this confusion, some junior leaders were able to maintain discipline in their
unit and enforce the laws of war. In other units, particularly the Scots Guards, junior leaders that did
not enforce principles of civilian protection and the laws of war and resented their mission may have
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contributed to unit participation in war crimes.
Training
The brutal violence of World War II led nations to negotiate and sign the Geneva
Conventions, which provide explicit protections for prisoners and civilians during war. The British,
although they did not designate the Malayan conflict as a war, began the process of incorporating
their Geneva Convention obligations into basic military training in 1949. In addition, British forces
providing aid to a civil power (as in Malaya) operated by the principle of minimum force. However,
the question remains as to how the British military educated its troops about minimal force and their
obligations to protect civilians. In this section I examine the British basic training curriculum,
regiment specific training efforts for Malaya, and the content of in-theater jungle warfare training.
Basic Training and the Laws of War
British troops in Malaya at the outset of the Emergency received almost no training in the
laws of war. The Basic Military Training curriculum focused on “drill, weapons training, gas training,
physical training, education, health and religious training.”59 Within the section on education, there is
some mention of the United Nations, but no discussion of the laws of war. Even in documents
about officer training, there is no mention of international law or protection afforded civilians.60
Michael Gilbert, member of the Suffolk Regiment, described his training: “teaching you how to
march, how to handle a rifle, and how to behave in a soldierly manner.”61 Training focused primarily
on skills needed in conventional combat, not skills needed in policing or counterinsurgency
operations where the presence of civilians could complicate tactical decisions. Rather than officers
training them in the principles of the laws of war, many soldiers noted that the purpose of basic
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training seemed to be to break down any individual resistance to obeying orders. Raymond Burdett,
member of the Suffolk Regiment, reflected on his experience; the trainers sought “to get us to
follow instructions, not to question commands.”62 Basic training for these troops focused on
infantry skills, not their ability to judge the appropriateness of orders in the context of international
law.
In 1949 and 1950, the British military began to educate soldiers about their Geneva
Conventions obligations; on 8 February 1950, the Army Chief of Staff noted that the military should
issue a pamphlet to communicate the most important aspects of the treaty to soldiers: “Owing to
the fact that Field Service Regulations are, we understand, now obsolete, we think that it will be
necessary to issue a pamphlet to all units to acquaint them with their duties in the field or occupied
territory under the Conventions.”63 In this pamphlet, the section on civilians details soldiers’ legal
obligations to protect civilians: “Civilians are entitled in all circumstances to respect for their
persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices and their manners
and customs. They must at all times be humanely treated and especially protected against all acts of
violence or threats thereof and, when appropriate, against insults and public curiosity.”64 The
pamphlet also prohibits specific abuses of civilians, including physical or mental coercion, physical
suffering, collective action, intimidation, or reprisals against their property.65 While these provisions
seem to cover most of the dangers that soldiers could pose to civilians, there is no evidence that the
military widely distributed these pamphlets or that soldiers read them. In the many hours of oral
histories I listened to, none of the soldiers mentioned learning about the Geneva Conventions or the
laws of war.
Burdett, oral history interview.
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All of the regiments in Malaya lacked sufficient training in the laws of war. Prior to their
emergency deployment to Malaya, the Coldstream, Grenadier and Scots Guards were involved in
many ceremonial duties in London. These units were also under strength, so the military added
soldiers to the Guards who had not finishing basic training.66 However, these units had the
opportunity to do remedial training on the ship as they traveled to Malaya. In the training
instructions for the Grenadier Guards, the commanders note the difficult situation they are going
into and the lack of time for additional training: “It is very probable that the Bn [battalion] will not
have very long to organize and train in Malaya, before it is required to operate against the bandits,
therefore, every opportunity must be taken on board ship to get the Bn ready and fit to fight.”67 The
same memo continues to detail important combat skills that the unit can work on, weapons,
medical, wireless training and compass and map reading; it does not include any information on
protection of civilians or the laws of war. Another training instruction details some lectures that
officers will give on board, but these only covered “regimental history and custom” and “general
interest” topics.68 Soldiers in these regiments noted that the lack of space, resources, and widespread
seasickness cut many of the last minute training efforts short.69 This training, and the continued
jungle training in Malaya, focused on obedience to orders and specific skill development. There was
no mention in these training directives or oral histories of the Geneva Conventions or the soldiers’
obligations to protect civilians. While the absence of training left troops unable to uphold their
Geneva Convention obligations, this situation existed in all regiments, which means that the lack of
training cannot explain variation in unit participation in civilian killings.
Jungle Training – Enemies and Friendlies
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When British units arrived in Malaya, they proceeded to Nee Soon, where they participated
in a short jungle warfare training course. British military officials in Malaya designed the course to
expose units to the unique challenges of jungle combat. In several memos describing the importance
of this training, officers mention the “legal implications” of jungle warfare. However, these memos
do not include a description of these implications; they are included in a special memo only for
officers.70 Although I was not able to track down this memo or any description of these “legal
implications,” other memos and routine orders suggest that given the military’s subordination to the
civilian authorities, civilian courts could adjudicate any violations of local laws, including murder.
However, I never found any documents that explicitly outlined this problem or how officers should
educate their units about it. In a U.S. military review of British innovations in counterinsurgency
training, I also found no evidence of training in the Geneva Conventions or the laws of war.71 Thus,
jungle warfare training did not seem to provide units any additional training in the laws of war.
However, during this course, many soldiers remembered that instructors taught them to
distinguish between enemy targets and “friendlies,” who included civilians or fellow soldiers. At the
same time, much of the training sensitized soldiers to fire quickly in the jungle environment. Alan
Tuppen, a member of the Scots Guards platoon that participated in the Batang Kali incident, noted
that jungle training consisted of a “lot of snap shooting practice at pop-up targets.”72 Raymond
Burdett, Suffolk Regiment, described the same kind of training, but noted that the trainers “could
put in a friendly.”73 While these statements do not specifically speak to international law regarding
protection of civilians, there is evidence that the trainers emphasized the importance of only killing
enemy soldiers. All units received standard jungle training in these early days of the conflict, and so
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should have learned the importance of distinguishing between enemy and civilian targets.
In addition to this training that suggested the importance of discriminating between civilians
and enemy soldiers, there were also general orders to arrest, not kill, anyone suspected of aiding
terrorists. Standard orders directed units to detain these individuals and take them to local police
stations for questioning. While these orders do not address the issue of training, they do suggest
how military authorities thought soldiers should deal with civilians, even those aiding the guerrilla
forces. William Colyear Walker, head of the Jungle Warfare School, describes a similarly
conservative rule of engagement: “Before you can fire at the enemy you are instructed to shout
‘Halt!’ in Chinese, and if, in the twilight of the jungle, where every tree may hide a bandit, you kill a
man who is not one, it is a serious offense.”74 Some military leaders communicated strict regulations
on unit behavior, both in relation to civilian detainees and insurgents.
However, not all units complied with these expectations or knew how to respond to a
conflict between orders and what they thought was appropriate behavior. Attorney-General FosterSutton, who conducted the informal inquiry of the Batang Kali incident, denied that it was possible
that the Scots Guards sergeant in command ordered the soldiers to shoot unarmed villagers; yet,
four of the members of the patrol claim that sergeant told them that the villagers had assisted the
guerrillas and thus the unit would shoot them.75 While some of the soldiers thought that this order
was unusual, none of them described feeling that it violated their soldierly values, or felt compelled
to refuse the order or report the sergeant.76 Even though the training environment suggested that
soldiers could only shoot at armed insurgents, there was no opposition to the alleged order to shoot
the unarmed villagers. Although why the soldiers felt this confusion or conflict is unclear, it is clear
Descriptions of the enemy in Malaya changed frequently during the Emergency. While the official military description
was communist terrorist (CT), some soldiers called enemy fighters bandits or criminals. Walter Colyear Walker, oral
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that their training did not prepare them to question orders, even if they felt they were inconsistent
with their personal or professional values.
British soldiers received minimal training in the laws of war and minimum force during basic
training and in preparation for operations in Malaya. British efforts to educate soldiers about the
Geneva Conventions either did not ever reach units deployed in Malaya or left no impression on
them. However, the inclusion of distinguishing targets in the jungle warfare curriculum, along with
the ambiguous concerns about “legal implications,” suggests that officers knew that British units
were not supposed to shoot at civilians. Among all Regiments, the standard of training was very
similar. All of these Regiments went through the introductory jungle warfare course and received the
same instruction about “snap shooting” and differentiating between targets. Since all British
regiments experienced similar training messages and environments, the lack of training in the laws of
war and obligations to protect civilians cannot explain why the Scots Guards killed a large number
of civilians when other units did not.
Enforcement
While the British military did not explicitly educate soldiers about their international legal
obligations to civilians, they did instruct them to distinguish between enemy and civilian targets. If
military leaders punished soldiers who targeted and intentionally harmed civilians, those actions
would have strengthened the norm of civilian protection throughout the units. Compliance with the
laws of war requires a high standard of general discipline and strong unit leadership. In this section, I
examine general discipline expectations and practices, specific discipline requirements of missions
aiding civil powers, and the influence of junior leadership on unit behavior.
General military discipline
The British military, in a 1945 document, “The Development of Basic Training.”
acknowledges the importance of cultivating military discipline. This standard of discipline must be
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more than just punishment and rewards, soldiers should learn to strive for perfection in all aspects
of their behavior: “During his training period we have to make a man understand that discipline
does not consist merely in breaking rules…From the very earliest days of service a man must be
made to realize that once he has been shown exactly what is required of him on the square, on the
training ground, or in military life generally, he must aim at perfection, not just now and then but all
the time and whether he is likely to be found out or not.”77 The message of the military is clear:
soldiers must absorb the principle of discipline and strive to meet and exceed the organization’s
expectations.
In Malaya, general unit discipline was mixed. Units on patrol had to learn to move through
the jungle quietly to avoid disclosing their approach to insurgents; they also had to manage their fear
of numerous animals and insects and learn to live in the jungle leaving no trail.78 Soldiers on patrol
had to be on guard at all times for an insurgent ambush. Some units learned the hard way that lack
of discipline often meant serious casualties when insurgents attacked. The Gordon Highlanders lost
a whole patrol through negligence; Dobbs, of the Green Howards, lamented their lax attitude. He
described the patrol as “walk[ing] through the jungle with your rifle slung over your shoulder” when
insurgents attacked.79 Other units, such as the Green Howards, tightly controlled units to prevent
casualties; Dobbs continues, “Discipline was so tight sometimes it made you winge, you used to play
a hell about it.”80 Colonial officials and officers with experience in Malaya knew that insurgents
could come out of nowhere and attack at any moment; they ordered units to exercise strict discipline
on patrols. Unfortunately, lack of discipline, especially during patrols, led to many of the British
casualties in the first year of the Emergency.
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The Importance of Discipline in Missions Aiding the Civil Power
Discipline and respect for regulations is even more important in missions that seek to restore
law and order. The military forces in Malaya were not in control of their mission; they were under
the control of civilian authorities. While soldiers lacked training in international law or protecting
civilians, the Guards Brigades, on the boat from the United Kingdom to Malaya, did review the
pamphlet, “Imperial Policing and Duties in the Aid of the Civil Power.”81 This pamphlet stresses the
importance of discipline, particularly in controlling the behavior of soldiers facing a challenging
security environment: “
Duties in the aid of the civil power call for the highest standards of discipline among officers
and men…the patience of soldiers when employed over long periods on these unpleasant
duties is sorely strained; casualties among their comrades and the acts of terrorists, who are
to the soldiers no more than despicable murderers, try their patience and naturally tend to
embitter their outlook. The desire to hit back and the ordinary and quite understandable
motive of revenge will only be held in check by good, sound, and humanely administered
discipline.82
The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, the seminal work that became the handbook of all
soldiers and that British forces adopted in other counterinsurgencies, similarly stresses the
importance of discipline.83 Lt Col. C.A.T. Suther, in a memo based on his work training soldiers for
counterinsurgency against the Japanese, notes that officers must enforce basic standards of
discipline, even in the jungle: “Despite such conditions as para 4 [jungle conditions] suggests, the
very highest standards must be the aim all the time including smartness, steadiness, and such things
as no falling off in saluting, etc.”84 Junior officers, for protection of the unit and civilians, had to
retain control of their soldiers at all times.
The actual practice of discipline and protection of civilians, however, was very different. In a
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memo on “Law and Order in the Federation,” High Commissioner Guerney argued: “It is in fact
impossible to maintain the rule of law and fight terrorism effectively at the same time.”85 He notes
that both the police and military forces break the law “every day” and insists that shows of force are
necessary to defeat the insurgents. He also signals an unwillingness to enforce the law: “it is most
important that police and soldiers, who are not saints, should not get the impression that every small
mistake is going to be the subject of a public enquiry or that it is better to do nothing at all than to
do the wrong thing quickly.”86 Another telegram in January 1949 from the High Commissioner of
the Federation of Malaya to the Colonial Office repeated this reluctance to interfere in military
operations: “One of the difficulties of this situation is that we have a war on terrorism on our hands
and are at the same time endeavoring to maintain the rule of law. I would also point out that it is an
easy matter from one’s office and home to criticize action taken by security forces in the heat of
operations and working under jungle conditions but not so easy to do the job itself.”87 The telegram,
which commented on reports of the killing of civilians at Batang Kali, concluded: “We feel that it is
most damaging to the morale of the security forces to feel that every action of theirs, after the event,
is going to be examined with meticulous care.”88 While it is important for civilians to give some
deference to soldiers in incidents where the enemy claims security forces act inappropriately, the
British civilian authorities seemed to prefer to ignore such claims altogether. Although some soldiers
remembered strict controls on their behavior and accountability for civilian killings, and received
warning about killing civilians and “legal implications” during their jungle training, authorities
seemed reluctant to hold units accountable.
In the Batang Kali incident, the Attorney General conducted an informal inquiry during
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which he visited the site and interviewed a few of the soldiers on the patrol. However, he never
interviewed any of the female villagers who witnessed the alleged massacre. His conclusion, in which
he acquitted the unit of any wrongdoing, was that the soldiers had made a “bonafide mistake.” He
does not describe the nature of this mistake, or suggest units could avoid making such a mistake in
the future. If lack of discipline or training led to this mistake, the military should have held someone
accountable.
The blame for this inaction, or action to avoid accountability, however, cannot fall only on
civilian leaders’ reluctance to intervene. When authorities did attempt to uphold the law and
regulations, particularly on the use of force against civilians, military leaders would balk and threaten
to abort the entire mission in Malaya. Ronald Denys Eden Buckland, who served as a staff officer in
the Guards Brigade in Malaya from 1950-1952, describes a botched ambush in which soldiers killed
a woman and injured an old man. He noted that the soldiers had not followed the general orders to
call out to the individuals because “by the time you shouted out in Chinese, Malaya, Tamil three
times they’ve either shot you if they’re baddies or they’ve scampered.”89 However, the civilian
magistrate in charge of the inquest found the unit responsible for the death and noted that the civil
authorities would try the soldiers under local law. Buckland approached the head of the British
forces in Malaya, General John Harding, who threatened the civilian high commissioner, Sir Henry
Guerney, with a full military pullout. According to Buckland, Harding told Guerney, “Unless you
can sort this out pretty speedily, I’m going to have the whole of the army out of the jungle and the
war is over as far as I am concerned, because I’m not going to have this happening.”90 Guerney
arranged for a more informal inquiry, which deemed that no one unit or person acted
inappropriately. The military leadership’s intervention sent a signal to units that civilian authorities
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had no power to question their actions.
Aside from these examples, there is little evidence that the military enforced policies
regarding protection of civilians. Although diaries and oral histories note a few occasions of soldiers
writing reports of accidental killings of civilians, or attending court inquests, the British military did
not retain these reports.91 There is no evidence that the military leadership investigated these
incidents. Units did not include accidental civilian deaths in unit reports, and sub-districts also did
not include accidental deaths in their reports to the Ministry of Defense or the Colonial Office.
Senior leadership failed to send credible signals about their respect for international law and soldiers’
obligations to protect civilians.
Junior Leadership
Even if the military as an organization does a poor job of enforcing discipline, junior leaders
can command the respect of their unit and enforce principles of the laws of war and civilian
protection. The British military, with its vast experience in colonial warfare, acknowledged the
importance of strong junior leaders. In “Lessons from the Emergency,” the Director of Operations
in Malaya reflects: “The key to success or failure has been the quality of leadership by the
Commanding Officer himself and among the junior officers and noncommissioned officers.”92 In
the Grenadier Guards Training Instructions, issued prior to the unit’s arrival in Malaya, officers
noted: “Junior leaders – it is expected that Pls [platoons] and Secs [sections] will have to operate
independently in the jungle, and therefore a very high standard of junior leading will be required.
Coy [Company] Comds [commanders] must do what they can to impress on their young Ofrs
[officers] and NCOs [noncommissioned officers] the big responsibility that will rest on their
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shoulders.”93 Junior officers, given the decentralization of the forces in Malaya and the lack of
communication between headquarters and units on jungle patrols, had extra responsibilities in terms
of exerting discipline and controlling their units.
Some units flourished under strong junior leadership. The Suffolk Regiment, which
historians consider one of the most successful units in Malaya, respected official military principles
recognizing the importance of discipline and the protection of civilians. William Martin of the
Suffolk regiment reflected the official position that civilian casualties carried some cost for those
responsible: “the shooting of an innocent person …were terrible headaches to a company
commander because it was their responsibility.”94 Many Suffolks credit their discipline and strong
performance to their officers. Martin was grateful for “very good platoon leaders – highly
experienced in jungle warfare.”95 Noble also noted the importance of officers; when asked why the
Suffolks performed so well in Malaya, he said “[the] type of officers…leaders are important…lots of
fine officers and many more that got mentioned for honors.”96 Many soldiers from the Suffolk
regiment reflected that they had outstanding leadership from their officers, which contributed to
their success and strong reputation among all the regiments involved in the Malayan emergency.97
However, in the Scots Guards, soldiers and outside observers raised questions about the
unit’s junior leaders. During the Emergency, the Scots Guards saw tremendous turnover in officers;
in the unit’s short time in Malaya (1948-1951), eighty officers served in the thirty officer positions.98
Alan Tuppen, one of the men on the patrol at Batang Kali, felt compelled to mention: “I would like
to state finally that there was no British officer with us on this particular patrol. I believe this is quite
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unheard of. It was certainly the only patrol I ever went on without an officer in charge.”99 The
platoon commander, George Ramsay, who allegedly told the soldiers that they were to “wipe out”
the village, did not actually go on the patrol. This absence of leadership could weaken the confidence
of the unit and erode control over the soldiers’ fears or desire for revenge. After the incident,
Ramsay moved to the headquarters unit and then left Malaya; there is no explanation for this move
in the unit histories or soldiers’ testimonies.100 Two sergeants, Charles Douglas and Robert Hughes,
led the patrol, and Douglas apparently had little leadership experience. As the only man still in the
military when the scandal broke in 1970, he claimed to remember little about the event.101 However,
other members of the patrol remember that he seemed uncertain how to get the detained villagers to
cooperate, and one soldier told a story of how he shot at a young boy, thought he had killed him,
but in reality the boy was suffering terribly and another soldier had to put him out of his misery.102
None of the soldiers who testified about the incident had great confidence in or loyalty to their
leaders; instead, they expressed fear of punishment.
James Calvert, who visited numerous units and advised General Harding, also saw
difficulties with the unit leadership in the Scots Guards. He remembered a conversation with a
platoon commander who claimed that his unit shouldn’t be in Malaya: “[The battalion was] raised
and trained and organized to fight in Europe. I’m not going to upset the whole organization and
training of my battalion just to chase a lot of bare assed niggers around the jungle.”103 This
commander, who GOC Harding eventually removed from his position, expressed resistance to
tactical innovation that eventually helped the British win the war in Malaya. This officer set the tone
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for his unit; they would likely follow his lead in resisting change. This comment reflects a lack of
respect for the mission and the enemy. The resulting frustration with failed tactics could have led his
unit to kill civilians that they saw aiding the enemy.
Enforcement of protection of civilians was, at best, inconsistent during the Malayan
Emergency. Many soldiers felt only minimal responsibility to uphold military regulations because
they saw that military leaders were willing to intervene on their behalf and civilian leaders were
reluctant to challenge the military. Although the military, through official documents, stressed the
importance of discipline, particularly in missions such as the one in Malaya, its enforcement of
discipline did not convince soldiers that the organization was committed to civilian protection or the
laws of war. However, at the junior leadership level, the picture becomes more complicated. While
some units had excellent junior leadership and displayed good adherence to discipline, others had
inexperienced or inadequate leadership and foundered. Lack of leadership, especially in a difficult
environment such as Malaya, might leave soldiers feeling vulnerable and angry at the organization.
Also, as the British military anticipated, a lack of discipline could lead soldiers to strike at civilians.
This variation in junior leadership at the regiment level could explain why the Scots Guards engaged
in mass killing of civilians when other regiments did not.

The British military failed to adequately socialize units about the importance of the laws of
war. Training programs did not specifically inform soldiers of their obligations. While there was
some effort in the jungle training to encourage units to distinguish between the enemy and civilian
targets, the unwillingness of civilian and military leaders to punish civilian killings meant units saw
few reasons to take extra risks to protect civilians. While the organization’s socialization did not
persuade units to comply with the laws of war, some junior leaders were able to control their units
and protect civilians; less experienced or motivated junior officers did not. Junior leadership is one
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of the key difference between units that may explain why the Scots Guards killed civilians when
other units did not.

Civilian Influence
When Britain returned to Malaya after World War II, the colonial empire was crumbling.
Britain lacked sufficient resources to maintain its presence around the world. In Malaya, the British
return to power met local opposition. British officials, to achieve cooperation with local elites,
conceded that Malayan independence was inevitable. Despite this acknowledgement, the
government poured substantial resources into the country to fight insurgents during the Emergency.
How did British civilian policymakers justify this effort to military leaders and soldiers? Did these
justifications lead units to kill civilians? In this section I examine Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s
government and its attempts to contextualize the conflict as part of the Cold War and the fight
against worldwide communism. I also examine civilian inattention to British military’s role in the
Malayan conflict, and describe its effects on local tactics and unit behavior. Finally, I examine civilian
rhetoric about the conflict and test whether attempts to dehumanize the enemy led to unit
participation in war crimes. I find that civilian leaders’ labeling of the conflict as an “Emergency”
undermined their efforts to link the conflict with Cold War. Civilian leaders inattention to the
conflict also led military leaders to develop their own strategies that proved inconsistent with the
political nature of the conflict. Soldiers recognized their government’s lack of involvement and were
cynical about their mission. However, given that many British units shared these sentiments, civilian
influence cannot explain variation in unit participation in war crimes.
Malaya and the Cold War
When the Colonial Office declared the Emergency, threats from the Soviet Union and
communism in Europe dominated the agenda of leaders in London. However, the threat to British
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civilians and business interests in Malaya forced the government to temporarily shift its focus to
Asia.104 Creech Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies, argued in July 1948 that the Malayan
Communist Party, which he blamed for the violence in Malaya, was “the nerve center for the whole
subversive movement.”105 A Colonial Office memo in March 1949 noted that British failure in
Malaya could lead to communist victories throughout all of Southeast Asia: “There is a distinct
danger that, as measures are developed for the security of Europe and the Middle East, pressure
[from the Soviet Union] upon South East Asia will increase…if the general impression prevails in
South East Asia that the Western Powers are unwilling and unable to assist in resisting Russian
pressure…eventually the whole of South East Asia will fall a victim to the Communist advance and
thus come under Russian domination.”106 While Attlee did not convey this danger explicitly to the
British public, Winston Churchill, leader of the opposition, during a campaign speech in October
1949, noted the Communist threat: “Let them [communists] cease to distract in Malaya and
Indonesia. Let them liberate the Communist-held portion of Korea. Let them cease to foment the
hideous protracted war in China. Above all, let them throw open their vast regions on equal terms to
the ordinary travel and traffic of mankind. Let them give others the chance to breathe freely, and let
them breathe freely themselves.”107 British civilian leaders clearly felt that, in addition to their
economic interests in Malaya, they had to respond to this threat of communist aggression. The
ideological importance of this conflict could have led units to believe that the laws of war and
principle of minimum force did not apply; given the existential threat of communism, units could
have exceeded these limits to defend British, and Western, ways of life.
While Churchill arguably showed greater commitment to Malaya when he took power in
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1951, during the early days of the Emergency, civilian leaders did not match their rhetoric with
interest in the particulars of the conflict. Robert Thompson, who had experience with the British
campaign in Burma and later became the permanent Secretary of Defense in Malaya, noted that
there was very little coverage of the Emergency in the London newspapers, so there was no sense of
urgency to press the government to act.108 The Chief of Staff stated the lack of a government policy
starkly in a Cabinet level meeting about Malaya on June 21, 1950: “Before sending any more troops
into Malaya we consider we must know where we are going.”109Although civilians talked of the
conflict as part of the larger Cold War, their commitment did not go far beyond the notion that they
must ‘do something.’ Rather than units feeling compelled to exceed the laws of war to defeat a
dangerous foe, they may instead have felt that the government abandoned them and left them to
fend for themselves. This isolation could have led soldiers to prioritize self-preservation and kill
anyone, including civilians, who posed a potential threat.
In the absence of a larger strategic vision, soldiers lacked a clear understanding of why they
were in Malaya or what they were supposed to be accomplishing. The lack of attention to details of
the conflict in Britain undermined the soldiers’ motivation and morale. Sacha Carnegie, who served
in a Guard unit in Malaya, recounts his reaction to media coverage of civilian leaders: “Read about
unimaginative politicians having said the same senseless thing for the ninety-ninth time.”110 High
Commissioner Sir Henry Guerney pled with leaders in London to pay greater attention to the
conflict and support the British civil servants and soldiers who wondered whether the government
appreciated their sacrifices.111 Soldiers were skeptical of efforts to link the conflict to Britain or
national security; they saw themselves more cynically as protecting British economic interests.
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Raymond Burdett, of the Suffolk regiment, remembers: “They mostly emphasized King and
country, this is what we’ve got to do it for, but it boiled down that we were there to protect the
rubber and the tin.”112 British soldiers, rather than believing that the importance of the fight in
Malaya justified means beyond the laws of war, did not understand their mission and were highly
suspicious of grandiose explanations of the conflict’s importance. However, since all units
experienced the same confusion and lack of direction during the first months of the Emergency,
civilian influence, or inattention, cannot explain why the Scots Guards killed civilians and other
regiments did not.
“The easiest problem I have ever tackled”
This lack of civilian leadership left British authorities in Malaya to determine the tactics to
fight the insurgents; given the weakness of civilian infrastructure and the police forces, the military
received great deference. Military leaders saw the problem solely in terms of security rather than
taking a more comprehensive view of the political and economic aspects of the conflict. Thompson
remembered the naïve view of GOC Boucher. He recalls him bragging, “I can tell you this is by far
the easiest problem I have ever tackled…In spite of the appalling country, the enemy is far weaker
in technique and courage than either the Greek or the Indian Reds.”113 Boucher’s approach, which
relied on use of force, led to widespread use of Emergency powers, including arbitrary detention and
punitive actions against villages suspect of supporting insurgents. The police, some transfers from
British Palestine, used torture to try to gain information on insurgent locations and operations.114
These tactics created animosity between Chinese squatters and the British forces, and were
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counterproductive in generating the one resource critical in a counterinsurgency, good intelligence.115
Boucher’s tactics, which relied only on military force, encouraged units to rely on violence to control
civilians. However, since Boucher was the head of all British forces in Malaya at the outset of the
Emergency, his lack of perspective and reliance on firepower cannot explain why the Scots Guards
killed civilians and other units did not.
From bandits to terrorists
In 1945, when the British reoccupied Malaya, members of the guerrilla anti-Japanese forces
joined British soldiers for parades in London celebrating their victory over the Japanese. When these
individuals reorganized to challenge British rule, civilian leaders and the media depicted them as
annoyances or bandits. Once Colonial Officials declared the Emergency, rhetoric about the enemy
quickly escalated. In Malaya, radio listeners heard Malcolm McDonald, a British official with a long
history in the colony, declared: “It is the terrorists…who are now trying to impose on you a vicious,
tyrannical rule.”116 British officials already in Malaya painted the Chinese with a broad brush,
depicting them as terrorists deserving the same violent treatment.117 While depictions of the
communists never rose to the level of the demonization of the Japanese during World War II,
civilian leadership in Britain and Malaya regarded the Chinese squatter population as a potential
threat requiring action. These descriptions could have led units to believe that the laws of war did
not apply to these civilians.
While local British authorities ramped up their rhetoric, policymakers in London began a
delicate dance between linking the conflict to the larger war on communism and the need to protect
the economic interests of British businesses in Malaya. Leaders labeled the conflict an “Emergency,”
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rather than a war, to protect these businesses’ insurance policies.118 This limitation hurt
policymakers’ credibility as they tried to convince their international colleagues and the British public
of the seriousness of the conflict. As the Regional Information Officer in Malaya lamented, “This
ban [on the designation of the violence as a war or description of the insurgents as the “enemy”]
…has had the effect of preventing public opinion both inside and outside Malaya from obtaining a
clear picture of the seriousness of the MCP threat.”119 This rhetorical limitation, which British
officials in Malaya and military leaders challenged, remained in place until 1952, when the gap
between the rhetoric and the reality became too large for leaders in London to defend. While the
term “Emergency” remained, policymakers compromised on the designation of the enemy; rather
than “bandits,” British forces would call insurgent fighters “communist terrorists” or insurgents.120
However, this change in language could not undo the confusion and lack of understanding about the
conflict that in Britain, the international community and among soldiers in Malaya. Civilian leaders’
decisions to protect business interests in Malaya undercut their efforts to place the conflict in the
context of the global fight against communism and mobilize public support. It also did not persuade
British soldiers that the conflict’s importance should lead them to abandon the laws of war or their
obligation to protect civilians.
“A job to do”
Many soldiers approached their time in Malaya as service to the country without any
particular feelings about the enemy; they were there to “do their job.” Paul Humber, of the
Coldstream Guards, had a simple attitude toward his service: “That was what we were they for, so
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we just had to get on with it.”121 Edward Slade, with the KOYLIs in Malaya both before and during
the Emergency, had few feelings toward the enemy: “respected him because of his cunningness, but
you never gave a tuss for him.”122 Michael Gilbert, with the successful Suffolk Regiment, noted the
risk of getting too emotionally involved: “I had no particular feelings as such or hatred…I didn’t like
what they were doing to my colleagues…I think you can get too emotionally involved in things,
you’ve got to see it for what it is. If they got a chance to kill you, they would, if you got a chance to
kill them that was your job.”123 John William Noble, also with the Suffolks, offered a similar
perspective: “I suppose my personal feelings was … I can’t remember it was a hate for them. I don’t
[think] anyone can say they particularly hated them…[it was more] a matter of they were terrorizing
people in the area, and we were there to stop it.”124 Many of the British soldiers who served in the
early days in Malaya did not view insurgents as evil or less than human.
A few soldiers came to appreciate Malaya and expressed empathy for the insurgents. John
Desmond Mander, with the Green Howards in 1949, thought there should have been greater efforts
to reach out to them: “What I felt about them was that we knew so little about them. And I thought
we ought to send people into the jungle more to get to know them.”125 Frederick Dobbs, also with
the Green Howards, felt pity for some of the insurgents: “I pitied the enemy – my politics at 18
were nil. I didn’t know why I was there, what I was there for…But I was out there because the
government said I was out there…there was a lot of young lads in the enemy camp who were
certainly in that predicament, some of them 14-15 years of age who didn’t know what they were
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doing.”126 While this more sympathetic view may not have been widespread, it does challenge the
hypothesis that dehumanizing civilian rhetoric would increase the likelihood that soldiers would see
all Malayans or Chinese as sub-human and not deserving of international legal protections. Civilian
leaders’ rhetoric, and its failure to influence unit perceptions of the enemy, suggests it did not make
unit participation in civilian killings more likely.

The British government, caught up in post-World War II recovery and the opening of the
Cold War, had minimal time or energy to devote to the Malayan conflict. Civilian leaders tried to
connect the Emergency to the larger global fight against communism, but they had to strike a
difficult balance between characterizing the Emergency as a serious conflict and protecting British
economic interests. The perceived lack of attention and strategic confusion from policymakers led
local military leaders, in particular Gen. Boucher, to fight the war using a conventional firepower
strategy that alienated many Malayans and deterred average civilians from helping British forces with
key intelligence. Although this approach might explain violence against civilians due to frustration
and a limited view of the conflict, because if affected all units in Malaya it cannot explain why only
the Scots Guards participated in mass killing of civilians.
British leaders’ rhetoric regarding insurgents, which linked them with the global communist
movement, also failed to motivate British units. Many soldiers never accepted civilian signals; they
simply approached fighting the insurgents as their job. While civilians may have tried to influence
unit beliefs, there is little evidence this was successful. Lack of civilian leaders attention to strategy
and tactics in Malaya weakened some of their more ideological proclamations. There is no evidence
that suggests that civilian signals had any influence on unit participation in war crimes.
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Subcultures
Developing regimental pride and identity is a key part of basic training in the British military.
Each regiment learns its history; training officers quiz new recruits with historical events and
regimental honors. Most soldiers stay with their regiment for their entire military careers; their
loyalty, while technically to the Crown, often lies with their regiment. Given the strength of
regimental identities, members of these units may develop an alternative set of values. In extreme
cases, these alternative values could conflict with military regulations or directions and lead
regiments to violate the laws of war. In this section, I examine the British regimental system and the
subculture of the Scots Guards. I also compare the Scots Guards subculture to the Suffolk
Regiment; this regiment, which also had a strong regimental identity, had great success in Malaya and
did not kill civilians. Finally, I assess the influence of regimental subculture on unit behavior and unit
participation in mass civilian killings. The Scots Guards’ national identity, and unwillingness to adopt
small patrol tactics, increased the likelihood that they would participate in war crimes and may
explain why they massacred civilian villagers when other units did not.
Regimental Pride
Most regiments in the British army cultivate regimental pride and knowledge of the
regiment’s history. After World War II, men called up under National Service did not necessarily go
to a local regiment, so training officers worked to cultivate this identity based solely on regimental
history. William John Martin, who served in the Suffolk regiment, remembered working with new
recruits to instill the regiment’s history and values.127 Raymond Burdett, also with the Suffolks,
remembers training officers cultivating pride and competition: “[they] introduced this pride against
other squads.”128 Paul Humber, a member of the Coldstream Guards, noted the importance of
regimental identity to individual pride: “[I was] honored in some way [to serve with a] famous
127
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regiment with a famous history. [I felt a] certain distinction, [I] served my country and served my
regiment with a certain amount of honor.”129 Regimental subculture served to motivate the soldiers
and give them an identity to uphold.
The Scots Guards
In addition to history and values, some regiments claim a “national” identity. Soldiers from
the United Kingdom come from a variety of “national” traditions: English, Scottish, and Irish.
Observers of the Scots Guards have suggested that part of Scottish identity is participating in
whatever fight the unit is engaged in; no one in the unit was willing to watch other soldiers go on
patrol while they waited at the base camp. John Baynes, a platoon commander with the Scots
Guards in Malaya, argues:
[Using small patrols] would have been unthinkable in a Scottish regiment, as opposed to
what I have heard referred to as a ‘pudding’ English one. No self-respecting Jock, however
lowly his rank, would accept being left out of an operation while the officers and NCOs
went off to hog the action. Had any tried to do so, I dread to think what the NAAFI beer
tent would have looked like on their return. The very idea of operating with parties such as
the Suffolks used was unthinkable in a Scottish unit.130
Oldfield notes that when the Green Howards served with the Scots Guards in Malaya, the Guards
had a difficult time adjusting to jungle warfare: “At this early stage, like other battalions before them,
they were still feeling their way. Operations were almost exclusively of company or occasionally
platoon strength.”131 The Scots Guards had a relatively weak record of insurgent captures or kills;
pressure would have been high to generate some kind of result to compare to other units. This
pressure could also have led to the kind of frustration and resentment that James Calvert described
in the Scots Guard’s leadership. The junior commander who Calvert spoke with aired strongly his
reluctance to retrain his soldiers to fight what he considered a lesser enemy in the jungle.132 The

Paul Humber, oral history interview.
Sir John Baynes, “Scottish Soldiers in the Last Years of Empire, 1901-1967” in Simpson 155.
131 Major J.B. Oldfield, The Green Howards in Malaya (Aldershot, UK: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1953): 4.
132 see note 108.
129
130

44

45
Scots Guard’s ideas about military operations, their unwillingness to change their tactics, and
frustration with their poor performance, could have led to Scots Guards to kill civilians.
The Suffolks
While the Scots Guard’s reluctance to adapt to the mission in Malaya could explain their
poor performance, frustration, and ultimately participation in civilian killing, other units adapted and
earned a strong reputation for their Regiment as a result. Many soldiers acknowledge the Suffolk’s
reputation in Malaya, and attribute their success to their leadership and small patrol tactics.
Raymond Hands, a member of the Regiment, noted that they “had a very solid reputation within the
colonial community and [were] highly respected as such for what they had achieved.”133 While
Burdett noted that they shared a strong regimental identity prior to coming to Malaya, the Suffolks
also built regimental pride through their performance: “best record, lost the fewest men…[I] didn’t
want to go with anyone else.”134 The Suffolks, an English regiment, did not feel that tactical
innovation threatened their identity; instead, they built on their regiment’s reputation through their
performance in Malaya.
However, despite the importance of regimental identity, even members of the Suffolk’s
acknowledge that much of their loyalty came from a commitment to their fellow soldiers and
officers, not historical battles or national allegiance. Raymond Hands described his unit as “just a
random selection of nineteen year-olds who were doing the same thing and received the same
training, and did the same job day in and day out.”135 The Suffolk subculture, rather than relying on a
pre-determined identity, cultivated loyal soldiers who sought the British ideals of perfection outlined
in basic training, even if meeting these ideals required new tactics.
Subcultures and Unit Behavior

Leslie Hands, oral history interview.
Raymond Burdett, oral history interview.
135 Leslie Hands, oral history interview.
133
134

45

46
Within subcultures, members who share the same values will bond together like a family.
The Regimental system in Britain fuels this protective culture; soldiers stay in the same units and
serve with the same soldiers for years. While many feel pride in their regiment’s history, most of the
former soldiers feel loyalty to their fellow unit members. As John Scurr, a KOYLI, recalled: “ [We]
knew a few things in conversation with older soldiers, I wouldn’t say the loyalties of ordinary
soldiers were directly tied up with the past of the regiment so much, more the immediate
regiment…all good pals together.”136 Protecting their buddies, rather than upholding the pride of a
historic identity, motivates many of the soldiers in British regiments.
Within this more personally constituted subculture, unit members pledge to look out for
each other and the unit; they internally punish any behavior that reflects poorly on the unit.
Subculture leaders may enforce these boundaries through threats or other forms of coercion. During
the Batang Kali incident, Sergeant Hughes allegedly told the unit that they would shoot the villagers,
and gave soldiers unwilling to participate an opportunity to “fall out of line.”137 However, none of
the soldiers did so. When asked why, most of the soldiers seemed to have an unspoken fear of what
might happen to them at the hands of others in the unit. Alan Tuppen recalls: “I did not want to kill
anybody but I was too frightened to move and make myself look a coward in front of the others. I
was also aware of the strict discipline of the Guards.”138 Later, in a radio interview, he said: “Well,
there’s always the chance of…not reprisals but fear of what your comrades might think, you know,
when you got back.”139 The interviewer asked: “In fact the pressure not to be thought yellow was
greater than the pressure to keep away from what might, perhaps, have seemed to be a doubtful
act?” Tuppen answered yes.140 Members of the unit also described colluding to concoct the story
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about the prisoners running away when they faced the inquest. While some do not remember
warnings about the possible punishment or colluding on the story, others describe the sergeant
threatening them with fourteen to fifteen years in prison if they testified to what they had done.141
This unit worked to conceal the secret of what they had done until members came forward in 1970.
The subculture, which serves a useful purpose in cultivating a group identity, created a fear of
ostracism or punishment that increased the likelihood of both participation in war crimes and
collusion to conceal the unit’s guilt.
The Scots Guard’s subculture, which discouraged tactical innovation, led to the unit’s poor
performance in the counterinsurgency effort in Malaya. Frustration with its lack of success could
have led the unit to take out its aggression on the civilian ‘collaborators’ at Batang Kali. The Suffolk
Regiment, which was more willing to adapt its tactics, performed well in Malaya and strengthened its
unit’s reputation. Other regiments that did not perform as well as the Suffolks still tried to adjust to
new techniques of jungle warfare; there was nothing in these regiments’ identities that encouraged
resistance to the larger organization. The unwillingness of the Scots Guards to adapt may explain
why they killed civilians when other regiments did not; the unit’s refusal to adopt small patrol tactics
likely led to pressure to demonstrate success and frustration with civilians suspected of aiding the
insurgents. The personal nature of regimental relationships and loyalty to fellow unit members
concealed responsibility for this crime, which fueled propaganda about brutal British soldiers and
emboldened insurgents to continue their struggle.

Conclusion
The massacre at Batang Kali, while a unique event in the twelve-year Malayan Emergency,
exposed weaknesses in British counterinsurgency preparation. While failed socialization and civilian
141
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attention cannot explain why the Scots Guards killed civilians when other units on similar patrols
did not, they do identify important points at which greater attention or effort on the part of civilian
or military leaders could have prevented the tragic killing of civilians.
The British military, despite its long history of colonial occupation and managing indigenous
resistance, did not adequately socialize soldiers in the laws of war or their obligations to protect
civilians. Most descriptions of training from the soldiers’ perspectives emphasized the importance of
obedience and military skills. Some of the soldiers at Batang Kali had a sense that the orders to kill
the civilians were wrong, but were not confident in that assessment and did not know how to
question their superior officer’s orders. If the British military had paid greater attention to educating
soldiers about the laws of war and giving them tools to challenge illegal orders, some of the soldiers
may have stepped forward to prevent the massacre. While some of the patrol members’ 1970
“revelations” of the massacre may have been self-serving, their hesitant tone suggests that one
soldier’s opposition to the sergeant’s orders might have given them the confidence to resist as well.
However, since all units received the same minimal training, this lack of training cannot explain unit
variation in participation in war crimes.
In addition to this lack of training, the military did not do a good job of enforcing discipline
in Malaya. While many senior officers stressed the importance of discipline, particularly in jungle
warfare, at lower levels junior officers varied in their enforcement. Some units, such as the Green
Howards, exercised strong discipline; others, such as the Gordon Highlanders, learned the hard way.
While the Scots Guards were lucky to avoid serious casualties because of their lack of discipline,
their junior officers reflected a highly dismissive attitude regarding the conflict, the enemy, and
effective military tactics. These junior leaders resented their mission and refused to adapt, which
eroded their soldiers respect for the organization and its regulations. In contrast, the strong junior
leadership of the Suffolks earned the unit a good reputation in Malaya and their soldiers upheld the
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laws of war. Poor junior leadership in the Scots Guards may explain why they participated in war
crimes while other units did not.
Civilian leaders, focused on the Cold War, paid little attention to the conflict in Malaya.
Conflicting interests limited their actions; while policymakers wanted to link the conflict to the
global war against communism, they could not risk characterizing the conflict as a war and thus
invalidating major business interests’ insurance coverage. These competing interests meant that the
British government could do little to mobilize international support for the conflict; their silence led
soldiers to cynically believe that they were only in Malaya to protect British corporations. The
relative lack of support from civilian decision makers also weakened efforts to demonize the enemy;
soldiers who hated the insurgents did so based on their actions, not leaders’ rhetoric.
Civilian inattention, however, did provide the military more latitude in determining tactics to
fight the insurgents, particularly during the first years of the Emergency. Boucher, and his reliance
on firepower, may have given units the impression that large displays of firepower would intimidate
the insurgents and force them to surrender. However, this firepower approach alienated Malayan
civilians and may have encouraged them to support insurgents as defense against British aggression.
While Boucher’s approach cannot explain why the Scots Guards killed civilians when other
regiments did not, it may have provided support to junior leaders who resented occupation duty and
resisted tactical innovation and rules of engagement that aim to spare civilians from death and injury.
The Scots Guards, with their unique regimental identity, resisted small patrol tactics more
than other units. This resistance, coupled with poor performance, could have led the regiment to
punish the villagers at Batang Kali for their alleged support of the insurgents. The regiment’s
subculture then concealed their acts, evading responsibility for violating the laws of war and the
principle of minimum force. Subculture, while a positive variable in promoting unity within a
regiment, can become sinister when it deflects external criticism through silence and punishes
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internal criticism through intimidation. The Scots Guards resistant subculture, supported by leaders
who resented their mission in Malaya, may explain why the unit killed civilian villagers at Batang
Kali.

Although the British did eventually prevail in what most historians consider one of the few
successful counterinsurgency efforts, brutality towards civilians during the early years of the
Emergency reduced their willingness to provide crucial intelligence and risked creating a larger
insurgent force.142 The implementation of the New Villages Plan to relocate and protect Chinese
squatters and the appointment of General Templer to oversee civil and military operations in Malaya
changed the nature of the conflict and eliminated the confusion about the strategic approach to the
communist forces. Many British soldiers and observers also credit the increased confidence of
civilians in the security forces for generating increased cooperation with military units, especially in
providing intelligence. Discovering why some units participated in war crimes is critical to
understanding how civilian and military leaders can prevent these small scandals that endanger larger
political and military operations. The role of junior leaders, in both providing discipline and
controlling unit subculture, suggests that efforts to prevent future war crimes will have to target the
military as an organization and involve junior leaders in implementation of reforms.
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